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"In the last decade of this century there will remain only
two kinds of companies: the fast ones and the dead ones."
Andrew Grove, Intel-president1
I. Introduction
This thesis describes the legal implications and problems
lawyers face when creating "virtual Enterprises" that
require non-traditional forms of legal services delivery.
Virtual Enterprises are similar to joint ventures and
strategic alliances2 in that they are formed by 2 or more
separate entities to work together in the manufacturing or
servicing markets, but virtual Enterprises differ from these
in that they are more informal, spontaneous partnerships
3that come together fast and break up fast.
The term virtual Enterprises derives from the computer
industry where "virtual memory" describes a computer that
acts as if it has more abilities and capabilities than it
1Neidische Esel, DER SPIEGEL, May 24, 1993, at 200.
2This term will be used here as meaning a cooperative
venture of two or more companies without forming a separate
entity as opposed to a joint venture (see infra notes 87-94
and accompany ing text), ROBERT P. LYNCH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
JOINT VENTURES AND CORPORATE ALLIANCES 7 (1989).
3John A. Byrne et al., The Virtual Corporation, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 8, 1993, at 98, 103.
1
2actually possesses.4 "The virtual Corporation seems to be a
single entity with vast capabilities but really is the
result of numerous collaborations assembled only when
needed". 5
The term is nevertheless used in some different ways.
Davidow and Marlone in their book describe a corporation
using all available advanced management and venturing
devices but nevertheless remaining a separate entity.6 In
this context the term means more a "virtuous" than a
"virtual" corporation.7
Nagel used the term to describe temporary alliances
formed by fictional corporations in the year 2006 through
electronic links which are nevertheless legally incorporated
t't' 8en 1 leSe
I will use the term again in a slightly different way.
The creation of a separate, legally incorporated entity
creates a host of new problems which fast moving partners
might want to avoid; a pure contractual relationship is
therefore generally preferable for corporate partnering.9
4'd~ .
5'd~ .
6WILLIAM H. DAVIDOW & MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE VIRTUAL CORPORATION
4-5 (1992).
7Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 103.
82 ROGER NAGEL & RICK DOVE, IACOCCA INSTITUTE AT LEHIGH
UNIVERSITY, 21sT CENTURY MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE STRATEGY 79 (1991).
9THOMAS F. VILLENEUVE ET AL., CORPORATE PARTNERING 1-6 (1992).
3A description of the basic functional elements of the
virtual Enterprise is best started with a list of the most
important reasons for forming such an enterprise which are
similar to those for forming joint ventures and strategic
alliances today. In essence, "companies will collaborate
when cooperative arrangements better address their
requirements than do go-it-alone strategies, traditional
, , 't' ,,10transactlons or acqulsl lons. Today, "Technologies are
11changing so fast that nobody can do it alone anymore".
"Alliances are both a cause and an effect of knowledge
't' ,,12intense competl lon. Companies today no longer have the
complete knowledge and abilities to compete alone; the
development of new products becomes so expensive that no one
can assume alone the full risks.13 Virtual Enterprises are
especially useful in development and production of "computer
hardware and software, biotechnology, telecommunications,
industrial process control equipment and consumer
electronics.,,14 To be competitive in these markets,
10'd~ .
11Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 100.
12JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK 10 (1991).
131 ROGER NAGEL & RICK DOVE, IACOCCA INSTITUTE AT LEHIGH
UNIVERSITY, 21sT CENTURY MANUFACTURINGENTERPRISESTRATEGY 14 (1991).
141 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 1-2.
et al., supra note 3, at 103; BADARACCO, supra
11, 12, 79, 83; VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9,
4
corporations have to form alliances and new, redefined
1 t' h' 15re a lons lpS.
Based on these foundations and on the assumption that
business in the future needs to be flexible or "agile",16
I propose here the functional elements of the "Virtual
Enterprise" which is the subject of this thesis:
- concurrent development, marketing and servicing of a
highly sophisticated product with short life-cycle by
two or more specialized companies.
- short lived, highly flexible enterprise.
- high levels of coordination and trust.
- comprehensive end results may not be identified in
advance.
- distribution of rewards determined after the fact.
- ability to operate in context of participants being
contemporaneous competitors on other endeavors as well
as potential competitors on same product in the future.
- quick exploitation of a fast changing opportunity.
Unfortunately traditional legal services by lawyers
17dealing with business transactions and arrangements are
15Byrne
note 12, at
at 1-17.
161 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, foreword.
17VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-3.
r5
unsuitable for such future alliances that require "looser,
more open-ended contractual arrangements" instead of "highly
specific, arms-length contracts.,,18 "A corporate
partnering arrangement is a system and an ongoing
interdependent relationship and it must be considered in
this context.,,19 Lawyers therefore have to be able to
support these relationships by creating appropriate
arrangements.20 A streamlined legal subsystem might be or
should be created by government, but an analysis of the
present situation will help in itself to create "rapid
cooperation mechanisms" to support alliances.21
Conversely, classical or neoclassical contract law with its
emphasis on exact prediction of the future through contracts
does not help very much in the area of joint ventures and
other alliances. It neglects the ongoing relationship and
its influence on the reality of the ongoing venture. Thus,
relational contracting must be delivered by lawyers to serve
22these needs.
18BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 4.
19VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-3.
20'd~ .
212 NAGEL & DOVE,supra note 8, at 55.
22steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as strategic
Tools, 25 IND. L. REv. 397, 424-427 (1991).
r6
Creating a complex joint venture contract today takes
23five months to three years. Writing these contracts is
"an attorneys paradise"24 but might not help the parties
h f th' . t 25 h'l h .very muc or elr ongolng ven ure. Meanw 1 e, c anglng
opportunities in markets might require quick cooperation
within days, based on trust and not on complete
contracts.26 Time has market value27 and has therefore
to be taken into account by the legal professionals. The
"start up costs in time and legal resources" need to be
reduced or removed.28
Legal systems are often constructed in a "horizontal"
way, giving a complete and dogmatized picture of contract
law, intellectual property law, trade secrets law etc.
Special entities, like the Virtual Enterprise, need
adjustment of these horizontal systems in a vertical way,
linking the different systems together to support these
entities and make them and the legal services more
competitive.29 "The role of the lawyer ... in assessing,
23KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS 2-3
(1986); LYNCH, supra note 2, at 7.
24 BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 99.
25id., at 99 , 100.
26for an example, see: DAVIDOW & MALONE, supra note 6, at
21.
27id., at 22.
282 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 56.
29 Salbu, supra note 22, at 426.
7structuring, negotiating and implementing strategic
alliances is to act as facilitator, guide, architect,
advisor, interpreter, technician and mechanic ... in support
of our business people and the business objectives."30
This thesis discusses adjustment to the legal subsystems
that need to be made to support the creation of "Virtual
Enterprises".
An example of a "virtual corporation", forming many
different virtual Enterprises to reach its strategic goals,
is Novell Inc., a Utah based Local Area Network (LAN)
software developer.
Novell's NetWare LAN software has a marketshare in the
31microcomputer LAN software market of about 60 percent.
Novell is "executing a comprehensive strategy of
acquisitions, alliances and new product-initiatives" to
compete in the networking market.32 Acquisitions have been
used only in a few cases like the purchase of Digital
33 . 34Research in 1991, Annatek 1n 1992 or the purchase of
30 1 . t t . 11 .. th 1990Doug as G. Scr1vner, S ra eg~c A ~ances ~n e s,
COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1992, at 24, 30.
31craig Stedman, Novell Links DEC, 3Com to NetWare,
ELECTRONIC NEWS, Feb. 17, 1992, at 11.
32Evan I. Schwartz, 'The Industry Needs an Alternative'-
But Will It Be Novell?, Bus. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 69.
33Bill Machrone, World-beating strategies, PC MAG.,
Sept. 15, 1992, at 87.
34caryn Gillooly, Novell Unwraps Distribution Product
Plan, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 5, 1992, at 2, 67.
8the Unix operating system from AT & T,35 when it was
necessary to fully combine the products of Novell and the
acquired company.36 A merger of Novell itself with Apple
as a deepening of their relationship was considered harmful
to Novell because a merger would be expensive, restrict
Novell's products to Apple's marketshare of 15 % and harm
its relationship with other hardware manufacturers.37
To compete nevertheless effectively in the computer
market, Novell has established relationships and alliances
with a whole variety of other corporations.38 These
industry partnerships and the development of its open
network standard have led to an availability of many third
party products, enhancing the value of its NetWare operating
39system. Because Novell swears not to go into the
applications business it could build trust in other software
companies that traded technological information with Novell
during these relationships.40
35shawn Willett, Novell, USL Seek Tighter NetWare, Unix
Integration, INFO WORLD, Dec. 28, 1992/ Jan. 4, 1993, at 1, 96.
36 Schwartz, supra note 32, at 69.
37Nico Krohn et al., Apple, Novell Talk Strategic
Alliance, PC WK., Dec. 14, 1992, at 6.
38Schwartz, supra
39 b 'dDave Trow rl ge,
COMPUTER TECH. REv., Feb.
note 32, at 70.
Novell Grinning In the Catbird Seat,
93, at 1, 8-10.
40Evan I. Schwartz et al., A Novell Approach For Striking
At Microsoft, Bus. WK., Jan. 11, 1993, at 28.
9A review of the alliances Novell formed through 1992 and
1993 suggests 5 reasons why Novell sought these
relationships:
a} Creation of Standards and New Architectures
Novell established relationships with various companies
to create new standards and architectures as well as to
counter the Microsoft dominance of the computer market. This
41anti-Microsoft objective led to alliances with 1} Apple
and IBM42 that are intended to create new multiplatform
object standards as alternatives to Microsoft's OLE 2.0
43program, 2} AT & T to link LAN's and private branch
exchange (PBX) telephone systems, creating a new
44standard, and 3} Apple and Borland will work together to
d d . , t d d 45evelop an support a common communlcatl0ns s an ar ,
Moreover, Novell, Apple, Borland and Lotus intend to create
41Amy Cortese, Apple, Novell strengthen ties: cross-
platform technology is key to alliance, PC WEEK, Dec. 28, 1992,
at 1; Nico Krohn et al., Apple, Novell talk strategic
alliance, PC WEEK, Dec. 14, 1992, at 6.
42 . f' ft BM d th F tJane Morrlssey, 0 M~croso , I an e u ure: a
Conversation with Ray Noorda, PC WEEK, Oct. 26, 1992, at 147.
43 Amy Cortese, Group Proposes OLE 2.0 Alternative, PC
WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 16.
44 , II' d Ant' M' ft 11 . fHarrlS Co lngwoo, An ~- ~croso a ~ance or
AT&T, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 40; Stuart Zipper, AT&T,
Novell Forge PBX/LAN Interface Links, ELECTRONICNEWS, Jan. 11,
1993, at 14; Paul M. Sherer, Novell, AT&T tie NetWare to
Phones, PC WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 16.
45Apple Computer Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at C3,
D4.
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together a Vendor Independent Messaging (VIM) interface
standard which is delivered royalty free to 3-rd party
application developers. Microsoft has been excluded from
46this important endeavor, but is part of another alliance
with Intel, Sun Tech and Sun Optics to create and distribute
collectively a set of management application programming
interfaces, leading to standardization.47
b) Expansion of NetWare Interoperability
To expand the interoperability of NetWare, its main
product, to many different operating systems and
applications, Novell created relationships with a broad
range of companies to develop new products in this area. In
1992/93 these relationships involved:
. t 48-Sun Mlcrosys ems
49-Hyperdesk
464 Heavyweights Unite on OMI, PC WEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at
114; Jim Nash, Industry Giants Agree on E-Mail Interface,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 6.
47paula Musich, Vendors unite to Design Management APIs;
Group Seeks to Encourage Development of Administrative
Applications, PC WEEK, May 25, 1992, at 10; Computer Network
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at C 18; Five Computer Firms to
Create Standards to Improve Networks, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1992, at B 11.
48Nico Krohn, Novell-Sun Pact will Bring NetWare 4.0 to
SPARC, PC WEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 8.
49Jamie Lewis, Novell and HyperDesk: a Boon for
Developers, PC WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 40.
11
-AT&T50
-Microsoft51
52-Banyan
T . t 53- exas Mlcrosys ems
-Lotus54
-Hewlett Packard55
_IBM56
50collingwood, supra note 44, at 40; Zipper, supra note
44, at 14; Sherer, supra note 44, at 16.
5~Jane Morrissey, Microsoft & Novell: Can They Bury the
Hatchet? Keeping a Peaceful Balance Has Become Increasingly
Difficult as the Two Titans' Competitive Worlds Overlap, PC
WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 17.
52Tom McCusker, Novell Casts a Wider Net, DATAMATION, Dec.
1, 1992, at 28; Nico Krohn, Banyan, Novell Join Efforts on
StreetTalk-NetWare Link: LAN leaders Plot Next Moves, PC WEEK,
June 22, 1992, at 1.
53Barbara Bourassa, Systems Maker to Put NetWare On
Micros, PC WEEK, Nov. 30, 1992, at 3.
54Steve Higgins, Lotus, Novell Strategic Alliance still
On Starting Block: Development Work On Notes NLM to Begin in
1993, PC WEEK, Oct. 19 1992, at 6; Steve Higgins, Lotus, Novell
Sign Development Pact: NLM Version of Notes Is Expected, PC
WEEK, April 6, 1992, at 1.
55Novell, HP Team Up on NetWare for PA-RISC, PC WEEK, Oct.
12, 1992, at 3.
56Michele Dostert, NetWare, Host Integration Still
Elusive, COMPUTERWORLD,Sept. 7, 1992, at 1; Jane Morrissey, IBM
and Novell Update Joint Technology Pact, PC WEEK, August 31,
1992, at 1; Kevin Tolly, Nito Roque, NetWare and Mainframes:
A More Perfect Union, DATA COMMUNICATIONS, Sep. 21, 1992, at 73-
76; Bob Brown, Year-Old IBM-Novell Deal Outperforming
Expectations, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 2, 77.
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57-Memorex Telex
. d 58-Mlcro yne
59-Ungermann-Bass and Networth
_DEC60
-3com61
62-Compaq
63-Eastman Kodak
t· It' 64-Coopera lve So u lons
-Computer Associates International65
57paula Musich, Memorex Telex Bets
Turnaround, PC WEEK, August 31, 1992, at 141.
58. dM~cro yne Corp., WASH. POST, August 17, 1992, at WB 9;
Microdyne Corp., WALL ST. J., August 11, 1992, at B 4.
on Novell for
59 Joanie M. Wexler, Smart Hubs to Pick Up Server
Functions, COMPUTERWORLD,May 11 1992, at 14; Paula Musich, Hubs
will Gain NetWare Services, PC WEEK, May 11, 1992, at 21; Bob
Brown, Vendor Trio Posi tions Hubs as LAN Servers, NETWORK
WORLD, May 11, 1992, at 1, 10, 63.
60Stedman, supra note 31, at 11; Jim Duffy, DEC Announces
LAN-Based Deals with Novell, Microsoft, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 17,
1992, at 4, 7.
61Stedman, supra note 31, at 11.
62Jim Nash, Novell, Compaq Tighten Ties, COMPUTERWORLD,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 99; Jane Morrissey, Novell, Compaq Sign
NetWare Pact, PC WEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at 8.
63With Eastman Kodak's Help, Novell, PC MAGAZINE, Jan. 14,
1992, at 32.
64 Karen D. Moser, Joint Venture to Bring Transaction
Processing to NetWare, PC WEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 16.
65Caryn Gillooly, CA, Novell Discuss Unicenter Strategy,
NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 24, 1992, at 11-12; Nico Krohn, CA-Unicenter
to Get NetWare Port., PC WEEK, August 24, 1992, at 16.
13
66-Intel
Most of these agreements were related to one or two
products of Novell's partners. with IBM Novell created an
agreement involving about 15 products which expanded within
18 months to 35 without the need of renegotiation of the
67agreement. Only then, to speed up completion of some
programs and to add six new projects, IBM and Novell had to
renegotiate the agreement. To help independent software
vendors to incorporate NetWare application programming
interfaces into their system software, Novell also created
relationships with these vendors, offering them
. t 68aSS1S ance.
c) Filling Product Gaps
To develop new products and fill product gaps, Novell
formed alliances with:
-Hyperdesk, to bring object orientation to
microcomputer-based LAN's.69
66Timothy O'Brien, Intel, Novell Unveil HMI-Compliant
Hubs, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 3, 1992, at 19-20.
67Jane Morrissey, IBM and Novell Update Joint Technology
Pact, PC WEEK, August 31, 1992, at 1.
68Nico Krohn, Novell to Help ISVs create NetWare NLMs, PC
WEEK, Jan. 27, 1992, at 18.
69. t t 40Lewls, supra no e 49, a .
14
- IBM and BusTech, to develop a communications
70controller/host network controller.
-Computer Associates International, to bring mainframe
capabilities to LAN's to help in the downsizing of
1, t' 71app lca lons.
-Ungermann-Bass and NetWorth, to develop new wiring hub
72products.
-Eastman Kodak, to accommodate color photo files in
LAN's and to manipulate images.73
74-Serius, to create object oriented software.
d) Distribution agreements
To facilitate the distribution of NetWare, e.g. in
product packages, Novell formed distribution or resale
agreements with:
-Gupta Technologies75
70 1 ' h tPau a MUS1C, IBM Teams Up 0
Connector, PC WEEK, Nov. 2, 1992, at 7.
71Krohn, supra note 65, at 16.
72 'h t t 2MUS1C , supra no e 59, a 1.
73Nico Krohn, Technology Lets LAN Users Manipulate
Images: Kodak, Novell Project to Accommodate Color Photo Files
in NetWare 3.2., PC WEEK, March 2, 1992, at 4; with Eastman
Kodak's Help, Novell, supra note, at 32.
Offer Host Network
74Jim Nash, For start-up, $ 2 Million is Serius Money,
COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 27, 1992, at 113.
75John Pallatto, Novell, Gupta Sign Distribution Deal, PC
WEEK, June 8, 1992, at 22; Alison Eastwood, Novell Maintains
Enthusiastic Approach, COMPUTINGCANADA, July 6, 1992, at 55-56.
15
76-Compaq
t' 77-Re lX
e) Support alliances
To help the interoperability and distribution of NetWare,
Novell also formed support alliances with many smaller
partners.
"The (Alliance Program) offers the following to systems
integrators: 1. early access to software under development,
2. custom modification to source code, 3. use of Novell's
extensive testing facilities, 4. briefings and product
strategy, and 5. discounts on Novell courses and Platinum-
reseller level products.,,78 This alliance program might
also lead to standard creation.79
"The Regional Consultants Program is explicitly aimed at
consultants who do not resell NetWare. Membership provides
consultants with greater access to product information,
support, educational discounts, and potential sales leads
80through Novell."
76Morrissey, supra note 62, at 8.
77Timothy o'Brien, Retix Joins with Novell to Deliver
X.400 to NetWare, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 2, 1992, at 31-34.
78Mark Schlack, Novell Courts Integrators for Enterprise
LANs, SYSTEMS INTEGRATION BUSINESS, Jun. 1992, at 57-58.
79scrivner, supra note 30, at 29.
80Schlack, supra note 78, at 57-58.
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Legal service requirements and details for the formation
of all these different enterprises depend very much on the
specific goals of the enterprise and the therefrom resulting
operating characteristics. This is discussed in the
following analysis of the discrete legal service
requirements.
II. Analytical Discussion of the virtual Enterprise
A. Industries Most Reliant Upon Virtual Enterprises and
other Collaborative Agreements
As mentioned earlier, collaborations and strategic
alliances are directly correlated with the speed of
innovation and knowledge development and the growing
difficulty of a single company to develop and produce a cost
intensive product alone. The Virtual Enterprise will thus be
employed most frequently in cost intensive, high technology
areas, like development of "computer hardware and software,
biotechnology, telecommunications, industrial process
control equipment and state-of-the-art consumer electronic
81products." Partners will be specialized companies,
providing their "core competencies",82 to create highly
sophisticated products with short life cycles.
B. Range of Organizational Options
Collaborative mechanisms can be used (and are especially
scrutinized for antitrust reasons83) for both horizontal
811 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 1-2.
82 Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 98, 99.
83see e.g. ELEANOR M. Fox AND LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 282 et seq., 522 et seq. (1989).
17
18
t' l' t t' 84 h ' t 185. h .or ver lca ln egra lon: orlzon a ln t e meanlng
of collaboration between two or more manufacturers of
similar products and vertica186 in the meaning of a
production chain linking between manufacturer, supplier
and/or distributors. Apart from the Virtual Enterprise, many
collaborative mechanisms are used to achieve various types
of integration. Some are summarized here.
1. Joint Venture
Joint Ventures may be defined as "A union of two (rarely
more than three) companies that pursues a common purpose,
usually for profit"87 or "partnerships in which two or
more firms create a separate entity to carry out a
productive economic activity and take an active role in its
strategic decisions."88 For purpose of this analysis, the
following definition is used:
"A joint venture is a cooperative business activity,
formed by two or more separate organizations for
strategic purposes, that creates an independent
business entity and allocates ownership, operational
84 ANDREW J. SHERMAN, ONE STEP AHEAD 209 (1990).
85HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 133; SHERMAN, supra
note 84, at 209.
86HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 131; SHERMAN, supra
note 84, at 209.
872 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 78.
88HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 3.
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responsibilities and financial risks and rewards to
each member, while preserving their separate
identity/autonomy. ,,89
Joint Ventures are similar to partnerships but are
distinguished from them in "that joint ventures are created
for a single activity or project, whereas partnerships
contemplate a continuing business relationship. ,,90
Juridical decisions have generally simply applied
partnership law, which has provoked resistance and even a
call for a separate joint venture statute.91
A distinctive element of a joint venture is that it
92creates a new entity with its own assets and management
which may be incorporated to avoid unlimited liabilities of
th t . f th .. t t 93 . fe paren companles or e ]Oln ven ure. Cholce 0
form may also depend on tax issues, regulatory filing and
approval requirements, and problems related to third
89LYNCH, supra note 2, at 7.
90John B. Power & Richard S. Kolodny, Legal and Business
Considerations on Choice of Enti ty, in PARTNERSHIP& JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENTS, Chapter 2, § 2.08 [2] (Richard D. Harroch ed.,
1992); A. Paul Ingrao, Joint Ventures: Their Use in Federal
Government contracting, 20 PUB. CaNT. L. J. 399, 406 (1991).
91 d . b .. th . t tA am B. Welss urg, Rev~ew~ng e Law on Jo~n Ven ures
with an Eye Toward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 487, 488, 523
et seq. (1990).
92 HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 2-3; LYNCH, supra
note 2, at 7.
93Power & Kolodny, supra note 90, § 2.08 [2]; Sara G.
Zwart, Innovate, Integrate and Cooperate: Antitrust Changes
and Challenges in the United states and the European Economic
Community, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 63, 63.
20
parties, e.g. bank credits, contract assignments to the
94joint venture etc.
Joint venture agreements are normally comprehensive in
details which anticipate the issues expected to arise during
the venture's operation of the joint venture.95
Consequently, they may take from five months to three years
to negotiate and draft.96 Preliminary negotiations will
generally be followed by a draft statement of intention,97
a "prenuptial agreement."98 A typical statement includes:
"1. Spirit and purpose of the agreement ... 2. Realm of
activity ... 3. Key responsibilities ... 4. Method for
decisionmaking ... 5. Resource commitments ... 6.
Assumptions of risks .•. 7. Rights and exclusions ... 8.
Anticipated structure."99 Additionally, the parties may
enter into confidentiality agreements, noncompetition
100agreements, and exclusivity agreements. The final
legal agreement lays down in binding terms the exact
mechanisms and terms of the contract, relying on what was
94stephen I. Glover & Mary A. Wallace, Drafting the Joint
Venture Agreement, in PARTNERSHIP & JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS,
Chapter 7, § 7.02 [2] (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1992).
95id., § 7.01; Zwart, supra note 93, at 70.
96HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 179.
97LYNCH, supra note 2, at 147.
98KATHRYNR. HARRIGAN, STRATEGIESFOR JOINT VENTURES 363 (1986).
99LYNCH, supra note 2, at 148-149.
100LYNCH, supra note 2, at 150-153.
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agreed upon in the statement of intent.101 Often up to 80
percent of the contract negotiations are devoted to
t . t' I d 102ermlna lon causes an matters.
The joint venture's actual activities follow an
operations plan that is agreed upon before or when signing
103the legal agreement. The agreements set up control
mechanisms which ensure that the parties's objectives will
be attained.104 To prevent later problems the operations
plan is supposed to:
II-establish precise needs and requirements
-ask the tough operational questions and build
manager's commitment
-determine if the strategic plan really makes sense
when converted into day-to-day-operations.1l105
Though the joint venture is supposed to follow the
outlined operational plan, problems often arise during the
life of the joint venture. Smaller, operational problems
frequently are solved within the existing relationship
without the need to change contract terms.106 Strategic
or structural problems, however, may necessitate
101id., at 154.
102id., at 155; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,supra note 98, at 365.
103 LYNCH, supra note 2, at 161.
104HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 77.
105 LYNCH, supra note 2, at 162.
106 LYNCH, supra note 2, at 214.
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readjustment of the joint venture contract, 107 the joint
venture contract itself may contain provisions which deal
108with the possible readjustment of the contract.
To deal with these or other disputes between the parties,
the contract will also provide for dispute resolution
h ' d' t' b' t' 109mec anlsms, e.g. me la lon or ar ltra lon.
Though all future circumstances are difficult to
anticipate, the possible modifications and termination of
the joint venture are frequently detailed in advance110
since about 80% of the negotiation focus on this
issue.111 The agreement will lay down the circumstances
and causes prompting termination as well as how exactly the
joint venture will be liquidated or continued by other
participants.112 These termination clauses are deemed
, 113", ,very lmportant by lawyers, avold extenslve termlnatlon
l't' t' 1141 19a lon.
107 supra note 2, at 214, 221 et seq.LYNCH,
108 MANAGING, note 23, at 81.HARRIGAN, supra
109 Wallace, supra note 94, at § 7.16 [1] .Glover &
110 supra note 2, at 255.LYNCH,
111 , t tSee supra note 102 and accompanYlng ex.
112Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, at § 7.15 [1]-[2];
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 365-367.
113id. at 365.
114LYNCH, supra note 2, at 255.
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2. Joint Operating Agreement
In a joint operating agreement two or more corporations
join some separate elements in one single "working entity".
This entity is not supposed to develop new products or to
engage in research and development, but simply operates the
contributed elements for common use through the member
t' 115 h t II' t blcorpora 1ons. T e con ro 1ng agreemen resem es
consortium and partnership agreements. The limited scope of
activities minimizes coordination activities, making it
easier to involve more than two participants.116
The participants normally draft a concise agreement that
defines what is to be contributed to the "working entity" by
the participants, how it will be managed, what the future
contributions of the parties will be and when and how
participants can terminate their membership in the
agreement. The limited activity of the working entity makes
it possible to foresee most of the future problems, and
since the parties do not generally contribute proprietary
knowledge, participant entry and exit poses few
I' t' 117comp 1ca 10ns.
1152 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 78.
116'd1. •
117'd1. •
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3. Research and Development Arrangement
While the joint venture is a separate business entity
which is supposed to create new products and market them on
their own, a research and development arrangement pools the
research activities of the partners but gives them the
chance to use the results independently.118
The high costs and risks of R & D may make it very
difficult, especially for smaller companies, to develop new
technology.119 When companies choose this agreement, they
enable themselves to access new technology without giving up
independence to use this technology in their own way through
a joint venture.120 Therefore, while in the joint venture
new information is used first hand by the joint venture, the
R & D arrangement must deal with distributing the knowledge
t th t' 121o e par les.
The partners traditionally make a concise agreement which
describes the operations of the R & D entity, its funding,
termination and other problems similar to the joint venture,
but leaving nevertheless enough flexibility for the
118Andrew Pollack, Uniting to Create Products, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1986, at D 1; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at
23; HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 199; LYNCH, supra note
2, at 23.
119LYNCH, supra note 2, at 24.
120Pollack, supra note 118, at D 1.
121HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 349-350.
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h 122 . d dresearc. Because R & D 1S epen ent upon the
employees provided, the performance of the R & D is even
more influenced through the quality of people sent to the R
& D entity. Consequently , trust and relationship building
.t' 1 b' t' 123 1 . tare cr1 1ca 0 Jec 1ves. An examp e 1S he
Microelectronics & Computer Technology Corporation (MCC),
where the R & D entity rejected 90% of the member provided
personnel as low quality and started hiring its own
124personnel. However, such internalized personnel hiring
made it more difficult for the partners to repatriate
125developed knowledge. In essence, "embedded knowledge"
can only be transferred through transfer of appropriate
126employees.
since R & D arrangements must deal specifically with
intellectual property problems the partners must provide the
R & D entity not only with financial support, but with large
amounts of information and trade secrets, "embedded" in
127employees. Also the rules for providing the partners
122SCHRADEF.RADTKE & ADOLPHL. PONIKVAR,COOPERATIVERESEARCHAND
DEVELOPMENT 41-43 (1984).
123 ZWART, supra note 93, at 71.
124David E. Sanger, Computer Consortium Lags, N.Y.TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1984, at D 1, HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at
231.
125id.; Sanger, supra note 124, at D 1.
126BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 98-100.
127id. at 109.
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in return with the newly developed knowledge through
licensing or repatriation of employees needs to be defined
in advance, while the use of this information is left in the
128partner's own hands.
C. Operating Characteristics of Virtual Enterprises: An
Illustration
Two companies, A-Corp. and B-Corp., both domestic, want
to work together to develop and sell a new computer system
that incorporates a network of computers and software to
allow professionals, e.g. lawyers or doctors, to manage
their different office tasks, link different communication
machines together and link the professional to other
offices. A-Corp. has developed special knowledge in the
software area, while B-Corp. has acquired special knowledge
in the hardware area. Both companies will contribute these
"core" competencies to the new enterprise. They each had
separately started to develop their own knowledge and
products regarding these operating objectives, but concluded
that it would be more efficient and timely to use the
existing experiences of each other.
The new "joint" computer system will address a special
market segment in which A- and B-Corporations' existing
products do not compete. However, because the new product
consists of a combination and further development of each's
128pETER LoRANGE & JOHAN Roos, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 11 (1992);
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 231.
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"old" products, there is a potential for competition with
these "old" products.
The new product is defined in outline form, but details
on the resulting product and on the efforts to be
contributed by each company are undefined because A- and B-
Corp. need to formulate a contract within a short time to
get advantage over competitors likely to enter the targeted
markets. Thus, the contract formulates certain rights but
leaves many others only summarily defined to accommodate
anticipated uncertainties and provide needed flexibility.
1. Information Sharing
To work efficiently, the companies need to participate in
concurrent engineering, i.e. work on different parts at the
same time rather than develop parts of the product in
sequences. To ensure these parts fit together, the
corporations must share considerable confidential
information about their respective work activities which may
include valuable proprietary information like trade secrets
and copyrightable work products.
The most profitable use of the resources of both
companies within this "contractual firm" requires a pattern
of work product exchanges and integration that differs
significantly from relationships with outside suppliers. In
essence superior knowledge of inside resources of each other
generates the superior performance of the collective
28
entities,129 but this entails a fluid form of information
sharing concerning the virtual Enterprise that leaves many
legal rights undefined.
2. Joint Use of Facilities
The companies come together because each of them does not
itself possess all the "core competencies" and facilities to
produce the new product, and to add what is needed would be
time consuming, expensive, and make the enterprise less
flexible. Therefore they share their already existing
facilities to produce the new product.
3. Joint Contracting
The virtual Enterprise is not incorporated or a
partnership, it cannot therefore contract for itself, and
the parents can also not act in agency for the enterprise.
If the parties would contract independently with outside
suppliers or customers, they would be held liable
independently and would also be identified with the
enterprise. But the virtual Enterprise is planned to exist
as a different unit or firm and will develop some unique
identity, its product will be distinguished from the
partner's old products. If the enterprise is to be known by
this own identity or name and the enterprise's product being
129Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777 (1972) ,reprinted in ECONOMICSOF CORPORATIONLAw AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 19 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980).
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identified with the enterprise and not the parent companies,
the partners need to act for and on behalf of the Virtual
Enterprise, jointly contracting with outside suppliers and
consumers.
4. Development of Joint Marketing and Support/Service
Efforts
The enterprise does not exist as a separate entity,
incorporated and with own facilities like a joint venture or
a "normal" corporation. The parent companies will therefore
on their own and in co-work have to provide marketing and
servicing for the new product. The new product will provide
coverage for a new market segment, but nevertheless will or
may compete with other already existing products of the two
companies.130 The parents will be able to either provide
support in marketing and servicing together, e.g. offering
and providing of sale facilities, offering the product in
its own line of products.131 A useful way might be to
allow one parent to buy all rights of the enterprise's new
product and market and service it alone.
130Example: The Borland Office Package competes with
already existing products from Borland and Wordperfect;
Borland and WordPerfect Corp. Introduce Product Suite;
Companies Announce strategic Alliance, Business Wire, April
21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business File.
131 d . kExample: Borland offers the Borlan Offlce Pac age,
Wordperfect the Workgroup Extension Pack; id.
III. Analysis of Discrete Legal Service Requirements
The formation of the Virtual Enterprise will necessarily
be based on some form of contract. An "electronic contract"
in the form of a computerized "workflow" agreement that
minimizes dependence upon lawyers would be optimal, but
requires sophisticated electronic linkages and a very
"streamlined" legal environment so that no detailwork by
lawyers would need to be done.132 Joint venture contracts
today need adjustment to the specific market situation to
avoid unnecessary and costly renegotiation later if the
contract were too "rigid" or, conversely, too
"relational".133 This will be similar in the future for
cooperative agreements and lets therefore expect that
lawyers also in the future should and will be part of
cooperative contracts formation.
Cooperative agreement contracts may be seen by the
corporate managers as only nets for situations where
, 134 b t 't' t tsomethlng went wrong, ut a contex senSl lve con rac
132 1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 9, 39; 2 NAGEL & DOVE,
supra note 8, at 55-56.
133Salbu, supra note 22, at 414.
134HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 363.
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A. Classical Contract Law
promoted in classical contract law by enhancing discreteness
The main goal of contract law, to facilitate exchange, is
at 399.136'd~ .,
the different approaches towards this goal into classical,
neoclassical and relational contracting.138
135salbu, supra note 22, at 398.
may significantly influence enterprise planning and the
evolution of future conditions,135 the following material
forming virtual Enterprises. These approaches are
136articulated in the context of a "contract typology"
focuses on the approaches of greatest utility to lawyers
can progressively influence the whole relationship and make
defined by Ian Macneil. He defines contract as "the
, t' h' 137, ,proJec lon of exc ange lnto the future" and dlvldes
it work better. Because different approaches to contracting
137Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts 47 s.
CAL. L. REv. 691, 712-713 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil 1974].
138Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long- Term
Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 854 (1978)
[hereinafter Macneil 1978]. Macneil now calls relational
situations intertwined situations to give way the argument
that any, even the most discrete transaction, exists within a
relational setting: Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory
as Sociology : A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos,
143 J. INSTITUTIONAL& THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987).
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d t· t' 139 h d' .an presen 1a 10n. T e 1screteness of the contract 1S
enhanced by treating as irrelevant the identity of the
parties, delimiting the nature of the transaction, setting
rules for which acts establish the substantive content of
the contract, limiting available remedies to make
consequences clear, defining a sharp "in" or "out" of the
contract and excluding third party participation in the
contract. 140
The clear limits and definitions of classical contract
law make it inherently easier to predict the future of the
contract and therefore inherently enhance
presentiation.141 In addition to this, directly aiming
towards presentiation are additional techniques, which
equate the legal effects of the transaction with the
promises that formed it; by providing a concise body of law
that deals with the areas not explicitly addressed in the
139Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 862; Salbu, supra
note 22, at 400; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONSOF
CAPITALISM69 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON1985]. presentiation
is understood by Macneil -following the Oxford English
Dictionary 133306 (1933)- as: "to make or render in place or
in time; to cause to be perceived or realized as present". Ian
R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus",
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018, 1019 (1981).
140Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 863-864; WILLIAMSON
1985, supra note 139, at 69; Salbu, supra note 22, at 400.
141Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 864.
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promises and by emphasizing remedies based upon the
expectations created throughout the original deal.142
Discreteness and presentiation, achieved throughout these
means, will create a stable situation.143 But stable
situations might lead towards conservative market
strategies. In today's more instable, fluid markets this
might be dangerous and therefore classical contracting could
deliver a "disservice" for corporate strategies of
144today.
B. Neoclassical Contract Law
Between the extremes of very discrete transactions and
relational, intertwined transactions lies the area of long-
term contracts which is dealt with by neoclassical contract
145law. In long term contracts often not all
contingencies can be foreseen, adapt ions to the new
situation might be dealt with effectively only when the
situation finally has ariven and participants might assert
, , 'I d t d' t 146state-contlngent clalms, WhlCh ea 0 lSpU es. To
avoid a breakdown of the classical law system, some
142 'd~ .
143salbu, supra note 22, at 401.
144'd~ .
145Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 865; WILLIAMSON 1985,
supra note 139, at 70.
146WILLIAMSON 1985, supra note 139, at 70.
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The use of standards binds the parties and the contract
In direct third party control of provisions, an
This constitutes an "indirect
147'd~ .
148salbu, supra note 22, at 40l.
149 '1 1978, supra note 138, at 866-876.Macnel
150'd at 866.~ .,
151salbu, supra note 22, at 402.
152 '1 1978, supra note 138, at 866.Macnel
flexibility planning is incorporated and dealt with by
neoclassical contract law,147 while it maintains a high
d f 't t d t b'l't 148egree 0 comml men an s all y.
Flexibility enhancing means used by neoclassical contract
Performance, One-Party Control of Terms, Cost-Terms,
law are e.g. "Standards, Direct Third-Party Determination of
Agreements to Agree and Planning for Nondisruptive Dispute
Settlement. ,,149
to standards or indices set by an independent third party,
th 'd 150e.g. e consumer ln ex.
151third party control."
independent party will determine directly substantial
content of the contract.152 The contracting parties can
use any third party; nevertheless increasingly common is the
use of arbitration clauses which can defer the matter to
certain arbitration chambers.153 The available remedies
153Macneil, id., at 866-868; Gerald Aksen, Legal
Considerations in Using Arbitration Clauses to Resolve Future
Problems Which May Arise During Long-Term Business Agreements,
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In an "agreement to agree" the parties will leave
The use of cost-terms binds the compensation of a
at 869.
at 869.157'd~ .,
158'd~ .,
159Ingrao, supra note 90, at 417.
can be broadened substantially by arbitration
procedures.154 Since the continuing relationship can be
choice; sometimes he/she may even decide independently to
156terminate or continue the relationship altogether. In
much more valuable than a mere damage award, a wider scope
f d" d' bl 155o reme les lS very eSlra e.
In one-party control of terms one party will be eligible
to define substantial parts of the contract by his/her own
the latter case the drafters have to be careful to avoid the
pitfalls of consideration-theory.157
provider of goods or services to the costs he bears while
performing -which may be unforeseeable.158 A downside of
using cost-terms is that they do not encourage the party to
28 Bus. LAw. 595, 595 (1973).
154Aksen, supra note 153, at 601.
155id. at 597.
156Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 868-869.
reduce cost. Recoupment of costs is guaranteed and this may
inevitably lead to inefficiency.159
undetermined parts of the contract, but agree in advance to
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later agree upon these gaps.160 Especially when these
gaps relate to important parts of the contract, courts often
have held that agreements to agree are not valid contracts
and therefore unenforceable.161 Use of these agreements
is nevertheless not meaningless, because the prior
commitment of the parties leads to a psychological situation
in which the parties feel themselves more obliged to
negotiate towards a final agreement. In most instances a
final agreement is actually reached.162
To avoid immediate breakdowns of a transactional
relationship because of unanticipated grievances, contracts
often also provide for grievance resolution through
arbitration clauses, a form of alternative dispute
I t' 163 't t t' f t' treso u lone A very lmpor an suppor lve unc lon 0
avoid breakdown is delivered by such clauses which force or
lead to continuation of the relationship throughout the
d' t 164lSpU e.
By all these means the neoclassical system sublimates
discreteness and presentiation to gain some
flexibility,165 but it still relies on the rule that the
160Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 870.
161'd~ .
162'd~ .
163salbu, supra note 22, at 405.
164Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 876 et seq.
165id., at 885; Salbu, supra note 22, at 405.
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creation of the transaction and the definition of its
contents are done mainly through the full consent of the
parties to the contract at the beginning; this limits
adaptability in very relational contexts in which rules are
f d th h t th 't f th 1 t' h' 166orme roug ou e eX1S ence 0 e re a 10ns lp.
C. Relational Contract Law
Relational contract law is a conscious response to the
1,t f '1 1 t' 167 h' ,rea 1 y 0 commerc1a re a 1ons. T e lncreas1ng
duration and complexity of contracts impedes even the
possible adaptability of neoclassical contract law.168
Parting from the premise that only promise or consent are
the most efficient ways to project future exchange, Macneil
tries to establish a contractual system that is based on
"relational expectations"169 and that projects the future
, , 1701n nonpromm1ssory ways:
"In a truly relational approach the reference point is
the entire relation as it had developed to the time of
the change in question ... This mayor may not include
166 '1 t t 85Macne1 1978, supra no e 138, a 8 .
167salbu, supra note 22, at 405.
168WILLIAMSON 1985, supra note 139, at 71; Macneil 1978,
supra note 138, at 901.
169Macneil 1974, supra note 137, at 715, 718.
170id., at 719, 720, 726-735 et passim.
Internal and
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an 'original agreement'; and if it does, mayor may not
It ' t d f b' , , 171resu J.ngrea e erence eJ.ng gJ.ven J.t."
Of critical importance in such relational oriented exchanges
are the "relational norms" of "role integrity, preservation
of the relation, harmonization of relational conflict,
propriety of means and supracontract norms".172 As
relationships between the parties evolve, especially in
volatile and turbulent circumstances, the need for
flexibility in the transaction becomes more important than
discreteness and presentation.173 Instead of simply
solving a dispute in a certain way and providing monetized
remedies as substitutions, relational contract law favors
the continuation of the relationship, especially through
methods of alternative dispute resolution, like mediation
and negotiation.174 The "three basic contract interests
" , d t t' 175 h' h dof restJ.tutJ.on, relJ.ance an expec a J.ons" w J.C 0
not cease to exist in relational contract law will not be
served just by the interpretation of an initial agreement,
171Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 890.
172 'I VI' C t tIan R. MacneJ., a ues ~n on rac :
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340, 361 (1983).
173salbu, supra note 22, at 406.
174salbu, supra note 22, at 407; Macneil 1974, supra note
137, at 741.
175Macneil 1978, supra note 138, at 898.
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but by taking into account any behavior patterns which
developed throughout the relationship.176
D. Transaction Cost Analysis of Contractual Approaches with
a View Towards Virtual Enterprises
How should parties choose between the different
contractual approaches and which one would serve best the
creation of virtual Enterprises? A initial, insightful
answer to this question can be derived using transaction
cost analysis which analyses the economics of single
transactions instead of general market analysis. 177
Transaction cost analysis "explicitly addresses the question
of how firms should define or set organizational boundaries
in order to maximize the efficiency of economic
178exchange." It tries to find the "most economical
governance structure"for an abstractly described
t t' 179 h l' f th t fransac lone T e ana YS1S ocuses on e cos s or
creating a specific structure and the costs occurred by this
structure throughout the lifetime of the relationship.180
176'd~ .
177salbu, supra note 22, at 411.
178David E. Bowen & Gareth R. Jones, Transaction Cost
Analysis of Service Organization- Customer Exchange, 11 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 428, 428-429 (1986).
1790liver E. Williamson, Transaction-cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 234-
235 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson 1979J.
180id., at 239, 246.
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The "three critical dimensions" which characterize
transactions are, according to Williamson, uncertainty,
frequency of transaction and the transaction specific
, t t ' 1 d 181lnves men s lnvo ve .
1. Transaction Specific Investments
The first important step in defining the appropriate
governance structure is to assess the transaction specific
investments likely to be required throughout the
relationship182 and identify those situations where the
specific identity of the parties will likely have a major
influence on costs, i.e. "idiosyncratic" investments in
'II' 1 t 183Wl lamsons nomenc a ure.
If there are no specific "idiosyncratic" investments but
just standardized transactions, the parties can easily rely
on the market incorporating other suppliers and buyers and
use highly discrete contracts.184 If, however, the
parties are best served by idiosyncratic investments whose
full utility can be captured only in the context of a
continuous relationship they must employ a contractual
181'd at 239.~ .,
182 'd at 239.~ .,
183'd at 240.~ .,
184'd at 239, 241.~ .,
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2. Frequency
between the partners. A discrete, inflexible contract
at 241.
at 242.
at 246; Salbu, supra note 22, at 416.
185'd1. .,
186'd1. .,
187'd1. .,
Creation of a specific governance structure within a
As noted earlier, Virtual Enterprises are formed by
framework that is relationship oriented,185 i.e.
"attenuate opportunism and ... infuse confidence'I.186
enterprise or developed during its existence. The work and
specialized companies in order to develop and build a highly
sophisticated product. They rely on the specific knowledge
and abilities of the partners, as brought into the
embodYlng a "Classical Contract Law" approach will not
virtual Enterprises are therefore highly idiosyncratic and
highly specific and not readily obtainable on the market.
permit them to efficiently achieve their collective
dependent extensively on the quality of the relationship
knowledge they contribute to the enterprise is therefore
objectives.
a discrete, classical contract where the general governance
other these costs would not be recoverable; conversely the
structure is well known and can be easily and cheaply be
implemented.187 If parties would deal just once with each
relationship incurs generally more setup costs than writing
42
costs are recoverable throughout a longer relationship when
behavioral patterns develop which make the working of the
enterprise smoother and therefore more cost efficient than
enforcement of classical contract provisions.188 The more
frequently parties deal with each other the more efficient
therefore is the creation of a specific structure, based on
189a relational approach.
A corporate alliance is a living entity and is not just
190created and consumed through one contract.
Accomplishment of the strategic goals of the enterprise
requires the parties to confer frequently with each other.
This will be in the long run more easy and efficient when
the enterprise is open to the development of consultation
and adjustment patterns and does not rigidly follow
classical contract law provisions. The frequent, ongoing
dealing of the parties through the existence of the Virtual
Enterprise is therefore more efficient if the enterprise is
organized in a more relationship-growing, open way.
3. Uncertainty
If circumstances are certain, the parties easily and
without incurring many costs will be able to draft a highly
188Williamson 1979, supra note 179, at 246, 259; Salbu,
supra note 22, at 416.
189williamson 1979, supra note 179, at 246; Salbu, supra
note 22, at 416.
190VILLENEmffiet al., supra note 9, at 1-2.
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discrete contract;191 therefore there is no problem of
choice of the governance structure under certainty.192
However, under uncertain circumstances two possibilities
exist:
If the transaction is not idiosyncratic, the parties
always can and will substitute each other through the market
and do not need to rely on relation specific, expensive
t t noted.193 E 'f t 't 't thcon rac s, as ven 1 uncer aln y eX1S s, e
parties still can easily rely on the market and are not
dependent upon each other; they still do not need to build a
specific relationship to satisfy their needs and incur
t t' 'f' t 194 t Id th f bransac lon specl lC cos s. I wou ere ore e more
costly and inefficient to establish a relationship; creation
of a discrete contract under classical contract law for
standardized transactions is therefore the most efficient
t d t 't 195s ructure even un er uncer aln y.
The scene changes under idiosyncratic circumstances. As
shown, idiosyncratic transactions call for a more relational
approach to guarantee that the incurred transaction specific
costs can be recovered throughout the relationship.196
191Salbu, supra note 22, at 413.
192williamson 1979, supra note 179, at 253-254.
193see supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
194 'II' 1979 t 179 t 254Wl lamson , supra no e , a .
195'd~ .
196see supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
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Under uncertain circumstances, the need to work problems out
will even increase due to the always new, unpredicted
, t 197 T t' th ' 1 t' h'Clrcums ances. 0 sus aln e ongolng re a lons lp,
the parties will need constant adjustment; the most economic
approach will be very relational, open to a constant
, 'h' "198sequentlal "adaptlon mac lnery.
The highly idiosyncratic character of the virtual
Enterprise, dealing under uncertain circumstances and
creating a relationship that requires frequent
communication, necessitates a highly relational approach to
contracting that relies less on the original contract and
more on contractual provisions susceptible to adaption as
the relationship changes. To the extent the parties are sure
about certain details, they may memorialize them in detailed
provisions to avoid costs later when renegotiating otherwise
clear details.199 But their general approach should be
relational.
E. Details
Even though the parties want to form a contract quickly,
with a relational approach that facilitates readjustment
197Williamson 1979, supra note 179, at 254.
198'd~ .
199salbu, t 22 t 414supra no e , a .
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throughout the relationship, some details are needed at the
200start. They are summarized below.
1. Aim/goal of the Virtual Enterprise
Initially, the partners need to outline the purpose of
the virtual Enterprise and its business scope. The
definition of business scope includes 3 dimensions:
"determination of products or services to be sold; selection
of geographic markets in which to distribute outputs; and
specification of the intended duration of the
201arrangement." When a corporation is created the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) allows the
articles of incorporation to describe a certain business
202scope; if this not done, the corporation is presumed
200Nagel and Dove in creating their "Virtual Corporation"
through electronic links altogether without lawyers
nevertheless ask the partners of the future enterprise to
choose some provisions from a "menu" that provides them with
some critical components, chosen depending on the purpose and
type of the consortia. They list as menu: 1. Charter and Aim
of the Organization; 2. Anti-Trust Considerations; 3.Size of
Companies and Membership; 4. Membership
responsibilities/Details; 5. Intellectual Property Rights; 6.
Financial (and other) resources; 7. Tiering Relationship
between Participants; 8. Government Role; 9. Definition of
output-Deliverables Expected; 10. Benefit and Equity
Allocations; 11 Term and Break-up Details; Operating
Principles/Mechanisms and Resource Decisions; 13. Staffing. 2
NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 55.
201steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, strategic
Considerations in Designing Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 253, 258.
202REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.02 (b) (2) (1992).
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contracts where problem solutions are devised as problems
open as under § 3.01 (a) RMBCA so it may evolve throughout
at 323.
at 335.
207'd~ .
208'd~ .
204 Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 258-259.
205id.; HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 178.
206HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 324.
203REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.01 (a) (1992).
to be allowed to do "any lawful business.,,203 If the
business scope of the enterprise should be left somewhat
business scope definition, they would insert stability and
predictability to the enterprise,204 but this would limit
parties would become very specific in the progress of
the flexibility of the enterprise and could lead even to
termination of the agreement if outlined goals were
205reached. Using a relational contract approach, the
the relationship as the companies seek to use collaborative
mechanisms to strengthen and use their competitive
d t 206 h'l ' t' b' t' 207a van ages w 1 e pursulng cer aln 0 Jec lves.
arise, practical survey suggests that they need to agree at
least on the enterprise's purpose208 since an important
However, even where partners feel comfortable with open
success factor for corporate partnering is that the parties
understand their mutual goals and business objectives,209
209VILLENEUVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-19; James A.
Dobkin & Jeffrey A. Burt, A Legal and Practical overview of
International Joint Ventures- The United states Perspective,
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and that this understanding about the scope and nature of
the alliance continues throughout the relationship.210
The parties should therefore briefly outline the reasons
for the formation of the cooperative agreement, setting
forth the tentative strategic and financial desires of the
partners and declaring how they want to communicate and
build trust throughout their relationship.211 They should
outline some reasonably specific purposes along the three
business scope dimensions and provide at the same time for
contingencies that warrant adjustment if the situation
changes, thereby retaining flexibility.212 If the
uncertain, volatile situations in which the virtual
Enterprise works make it difficult to define specific both
the purposes of the enterprise in advance and the
contingencies that warrant adjustment, the parties should
also design a frequent review schedule in which they meet
periodically, evaluate the situation and readjust the
213agreement.
in JOINT VENTURES WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS Chapter 1, at 1-7
(James A. Dobkin & Jeffrey A. Burt eds., 1989).
210Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-6; VILLENEUVE ET
AL., supra note, at 1-19.
211LYNCH, supra note 2, at 149.
212salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 260-261.
213'd t~ ., a 261.
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2. Legal structure
In a joint venture, the partners form a new entity which
they both own and support.214 Moreover, the joint venture
owns directly its resources.215 In a virtual Enterprise
the partners contribute their core competencies which they
eventually want to retain for themselves. Additionally, the
duration of the Virtual Enterprise is normally undefined and
may be relatively short. Under these circumstances a pure
216contractual approach makes more sense. Except as where
managerial and operational independence of the enterprise
requires an independent entity, a purely contractual
relationship will be less troublesome for corporate
t "th t' d' t' 217par nerlng an crea lng an runnlng a corpora lone
But a contractual relationship brings with it also further
advantages and disadvantages.
An advantage of a contractual arrangement or partnership
is that earnings of the enterprise are taxed only once while
in a regular corporation earnings are taxed double, at the
corporation's and at the shareholder's level; this makes the
contractual form more desirable than the corporate form when
214see supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
215LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 12.
216id., at 11; LYNCH, supra note 2, at 119.
217VILLENEUVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-6.
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, t' , t d 218 t' ld 'dearnlngs are an lClpa e. A corpora lon cou aVOl
double taxation only when it would be eligible to operate as
an S corporation, being treated for tax purposes like a
t h' 219 t' t k tpar ners lp. However, corpora lons may no ta e par
in an S corporation as shareholders;220 this limits the
availability of the S corporation form for virtual
Enterprises to non-corporate partners. Furthermore,
maximizing management efficiencies through a certain
structure should play a more important role than maximizing
t ' 221ax savlngs.
A shortcoming of the contractual form is that it submits
the parties to unlimited liability for the enterprises's
debts. Limited liability provided by incorporation might be
desirable for the partners if the enterprise entails high
risks which the partners, even combined, do not wish to
undertake.222 This might be the case if the partners
would engage in a cost intensive research and development
enterprise to develop new standards as opposed to "normal"
risk when joining and combining already existing products.
However, to avoid the risk of a creditor "piercing the
218Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.02 [2] [a];
Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-19.
219power & Kolodny, supra note 90, § 2.08 [5].
220'd~ .
221Lynch, supra note 2, at 122.
222Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-6, 1-8.
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corporate veil", the partners would need to capitalize the
venture adequately and to operate it as a separate
t't 223en 1 y.
Another problem of the contractual form is that it
complicates accounting issues for the Virtual Enterprise
because it does not exist as a separate entity. Financial
consolidation and income recognition is made easier when the
t ' " t d 224en erpr1se 1S 1ncorpora e .
When dealing with third parties, the contractual
agreement can be advantageous as well as disadvantageous. If
a separate entity was formed, its viability might require
the assignment of leases or other contracts to the new
entity. This might need consent of third parties.225 The
parties might also find it difficult to transfer their own
assets to the new entity if bank credit agreements restrict
this transfer.226 Moreover, the new entity might need to
establish its own approved rules and structures before being
able to deal with outsiders. Under these circumstances a
contractual agreement is more convenient. The parties act
together on behalf of the enterprise, thereby using their
223Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.02 [2] [b]i
Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-19.
224J. Michael Schell & Marc J. Segalman, New Deal
structures in the 1990's: Mergers of Equals and strategic
Alliances, in CONTESTSFOR CORPORATECONTROL 1991, at 575, 611 (PLI
Corp. L. and Pract. Course Handbook Series No. 731, 1991).
225Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.02 [2] Ed].
226'd~ .
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already existing facilities and approved structures and
credit lines.227 On the other hand the environment in
which the virtual Enterprise will operate might necessitate
that it deals autonomously with outsiders -banks, suppliers,
customers- so that it would have to be independent and
perhaps incorporated.228 The parties should therefore
carefully consider how their enterprise is supposed to deal
with outsiders: either if the Virtual Enterprise needs to
act on its own and therefore needs to be created as a
separate entity with all backup funding and requirements or
conversely if the parties primarily want to act themselves
for the enterprise, thereby eliminating the need for a new
entity.
3. Capitalization and Resource Commitment
a. Initial Funding
At the formation of the Virtual Enterprise the parties
need to provide some initial funding that matches the
expected expenses from the outlined business scope. When a
new corporation is founded, the parties explicitly identify
which cash and non-cash assets -including employees and
intellectual property- will have to be transferred to the
new entity.229 In the Virtual Enterprise, when the
227 Ingrao, supra note 90, at 409-411.
228HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 336.
229Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.07 [1] [a].
52
parties join their core competencies to develop a new
product they want to share their facilities and human
resources. Transfer of assets to a new entity will generally
not be needed, but to get the virtual Enterprise going, the
parties nevertheless will need to commit these resources as
an initial funding. They might not foresee exactly what
resources they will need, but just as they need to outline
the business scope of the virtual Enterprise, they need to
outline the matching resource commitments. The parties
should also agree how they want to share marketing and sales
resources when marketing the new product to create
synergies.230 The evaluation of the partner's
contributions could be done together with the benefit
231distribution in an after-the-fact way. If a major cash
infusion is needed for a specific project, the parties
should define if they want to bear this funding themselves
or if the enterprise should approach the credit market for
th . f d . 2321S un 1ng.
b. Problem of Additional Capitalization and Credit
Since the partners do not know precisely how the Virtual
Enterprise will evolve, they must contemplate the
230HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 332-333.
231see infra notes 346-354 and accompanying text.
232HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 360.
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possibility of needing additional major funding.233 They
may choose in advance or later between options of third
party loans or equity investments, or loans or other capital
234infusions from the partners. To avoid a potential
impasse on this important point, the parties might subject
that matter to the general dispute resolution procedure they
establish.235
4. Responsibilities of Partners/Operation of the Virtual
Enterprise
Managing a corporate alliance is not easy since there is
not one hierarchical entity, but two or more independent
entities working together intending to use their facilities
236jointly and share knowledge. The partners therefore
need to agree on their respective responsibilities and the
t d th 11 . 237 hway they want 0 operate an manage e a lance. T ey
need to pay at least as much attention to how they want to
manage their relationship as to the financial
238agreements.
233Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.07 [2] [a].
234Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.07 [2] [a].
235see infra notes 380-390 and accompanying text.
236 LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 19.
237LYNCH, supra note 2, at 122; Salbu & Brahm, supra note
201, at 291, Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-10.
238HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 357.
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If the alliance involves a separate entity, the partners
need to create a new board of directors or "steering
committee", that can function as a project review
't 239 hcomml tee. T ey would need to agree on rules for
setting up these groups, decisionmaking within these groups,
questions of ownership or management control, and the
dependency relationship between the new entity and the
240partners.
If no separate entity is created, these problems do not
need to be solved, but the parties nevertheless need to
agree upon how to coordinate functions of the alliance, e.g.
through a steering committee.241 As far as possible, a
clear definition of rights and obligations of the partners
and the division of managerial control would stabilize the
alliance and reduce later disputes.242 Through creation
of a steering committee, the partners will be able to
communicate frequently, build trust within the relationship
and adjust their operational goals and programs to new
, t 243 h 'tt 'II d t tClrcums ances. T e comml ee Wl nee 0 mee
frequently and/or on request of the partners; it should be
239LYNCH, supra note 2, at 123, 131.
240id. at 123 et seq.; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at
291 et seq.
241LYNCH, supra note 2, at 122.
242VILLENEUVEET AL., supra note 9, at 1-19; Salbu & Brahm,
supra note 201, at 295.
243LYNCH, supra note 2, at 130/131.
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outlined which changes the steering committee should be
allowed to implement independently and immediately, and what
major changes will need approval by the partners.244
5. Intellectual Property Rights
a. Protection of Already Existing Rights with the Partners
collaborative partners can become competitors for the
combination of the knowledge and skills of the partners is
partners form an alliance to develop a new product,
at 131.244'd~ .,
Corporate strategy is based on the exploitation of unique
245competitive advantages of the company. When the
often resides in patents, formulas and other trade
secrets.248 If this knowledge represents the competitive
advantage of the company, appropriation or uncompensated
249loss of this knowledge could be very harmful. Because
intended and will therefore result in the transfer of
246knowledge. In essence, information sharing is often a
"key feature" of a strategic alliance.247 This knowledge
245BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 77.
246'd t 12~ ., a .
247Thurton R. Moore, corporate Partnering: Products
Driven structures, in CORPORATE PARTNERING, at 183, 185 (PLI
Patents, copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 248, 1988).
248BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 13.
249id. at 135-136; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 273;
HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 365.
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future, companies have to take precautions against
transferring competitive advantages to their potential
t't 250compe 1 ors.
Often, intellectual property -this includes patents,
copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks-251 will already
be part of the resource commitment, brought into the
alliance as a "soft" resource.252 The confidential
information brought by each partner into the virtual
Enterprise should therefore be sufficiently defined.253
The partners should limit their commitment to then existing
intellectual property if they do not want to be obliged to
also later provide newly, separately developed
. 254knowledge.
To avoid the uncontrolled spreading of proprietary
knowledge, the parties should also enter into a
confidentiality agreement, forbidding leakage of the
information, limiting use of the knowledge by the other
partner to the specific enterprise and specifying how
2502 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 43.
251 Ingrao, supra note 90, at 413.
252LYNCH, supra note 2, at 148.
253id., at 151.
254weissburg, supra note 91, at 491-493.
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knowledge should be used and controlled within the
t ' 255en erprlse.
But legal provisions protect knowledge only in a very
limited way, there are no absolute safeguards against
, t' 256 f lIt' f t happroprla lon. Care u se ec lon 0 rustwort y
partners and the building of trust within the relationship
is generally most effective in controlling undesired
1 't t' f kId h' 257 tt' hexp 01 a lon 0 now e ge s arlng. In se lngs were
knowledge grows old within short times, the best way to
protect and to exploit this knowledge can also be to market
it as fast as possible, perhaps even through the
II' 258a lance.
If a separate entity is created, the parties might need
to assign their relevant intellectual property rights to the
new entity. This assignment should outline the use, control
259and spreading of the proprietary knowledge. In this
case the parties will also have to provide for the division
of intellectual property the entity might own in the case of
termination. The parties need to agree which proprietary
255LYNCH, supra note 2, at 150-151; Glover & Wallace,
supra note 94, § 7.12 [1]; Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at
273-276; Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-16 to 1-17.
256HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342.
257HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342; Salbu &
Brahm, supra note 201, at 273; BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 95.
258BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 47.
259 Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 274-276; Dobkin &
Burt, supra note 209, at 1-12 to 1-14.
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rights will be transferred back to the original owner or
will be cross-licensed among the partners, which rights
developed within the new entity will be assigned or licensed
to which partner and who will be entitled on improvements on
. 1 d' ht 260prev10us y owne r1g s.
If no new entity is founded, proprietary knowledge does
not need not to be transferred to this entity. During the
life of the alliance and in the case of termination the
intellectual property should generally stay with the party
that owned it previously.261 If the parties shared
knowledge and further use of this knowledge is necessary for
the partner or will forseeably happen, the parties might
1 .d 1 .. th . kId 262 ..a so conS1 er 1cens1ng 1S now e gee L1cens1ng
agreements can be especially valuable in technology-volatile
settings to exploit the now existing but only temporary
competitive advantages of the companies as fast as
possible.263 If both sides are in this position, the
parties might therefore consider a crosslicensing agreement
as a backdrop for the case of termination of the alliance.
260Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-14 to 1-15.
261Ingrao, supra note 90, at 413.
262salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 274.
263HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 325.
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b. Dealing with Newly Developed Rights of the Enterprise
The partners of an alliance work together to develop a
new product. In this process they may create new proprietary
knowledge which is either truly new or derivative from
already existing knowledge.264 The parties should try to
deal with this in advance and define ownership and use of
this new knowledge. virtual Enterprises frequently operate
in high technology areas where ownership and contribution of
proprietary knowledge is hard to be traced and
volatile.265 Thus, addressing the problems in advance
agreement concerning intellectual property rights, the
Without a provision in the contractual partnering
rights of the parties would be determined by common law and
at 413.266'd1. .,
267HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 342.
268see supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
new entity was created, intellectual property developed
within this entity will be owned by it267 and the parties
264Mark L. Gordon, Key Issues in Contracting for the
Development of Joint or Divided Products, in 12TH ANNUAL COMPUTER
LAW INSTITUTE, at 407, 411 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 301, 1990).
265'd t 4121. ., a .
will have to provide for distribution of these rights in
f t ' t' 268case 0 ermlna lone
will help the parties later to exploit their contributed
k d d th 1 d 1 d t h 1 ' 266 fnowle ge an e new y eve ope ec no ogles. I a
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statutory regulations.269 For a work under protection of
270the copyright laws, which includes computer software,
a joint product in which two authors merged their ideas will
be jointly owned by both and can be independently
exploited.271 A major problem here is to differentiate
this joint product from a collective work in which the
contributions of the parties could be separated and would be
272owned separately. Another problem is how to determine
the status and ownership of a derivative work and its
relationship to the owner of the original work.273
Jointly created trade secrets would also be jointly owned
274by the partners. But the scope of the resulting rights
and obligations regarding their use and protection would be
quite unclear and lead to high uncertainty about the rights
275among the partners. A derivative trade secret would
, , I 276 , 'lalso be owned ]olntly by the deve opers, but Slml ar
questions arise about secrecy, rights of the developers and
269 note 264, at 414.Gordon, supra
270'd at 415-416.~ .,
271'd at 419-420.~ .,
272'd at 420-421.~ .,
273'd at 421-424.~ .,
274'd at 426-427.~ .,
275'd at 427.~ .,
276'd at 428.~ .,
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the relationship to the owner of the previously existing
t . I 277ma erla s.
Jointly developed patents would also be jointly owned by
the parties; all owners are allowed to use the patent
absolutely independently.278 This unlimited exploitation
right could lead to problems between the partners.279 For
example, if a derivative patent is invented, again problems
about the relationship with the inventor arise.280 These
unsolved problems become even more complex, when different
intellectual property right protection mechanisms apply to
281one product.
In light of these problems the virtual Enterprise-partners
should anticipate the categories of property rights issues
inherent in their particular collaboration and enter into an
adequate agreement, insofar as this is possible under time
constraints and uncertain circumstances.282 These efforts
would normally start with a procedural framework, including
definitions and administrative procedures such as
development monitoring and progress reports to trace the use
277'd at 429.~ .,
278'd at 430.~ .,
279'd at 433.~ .,
280'd at 433-434.~ .,
281'd at 434.~ .,
282'd at 435.~ .,
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283and development of the proprietary knowledge. The
parties then can create a structure that properly allocates
the ownership rights.
In virtual Enterprises the partners work together and
contribute their complimentary abilities. As far as the
parties develop separately parts of the new product, the
fairest outcome might be to let both parties own what they
developed, but this might be problematic when it is
difficult to separate each party's inputs.284 Joint
ownership for these kinds of products might thus be
285preferable. However, if the parties intend to compete
in the same market with the new product, unlimited rights to
use the product for both parties might harm them,286 e.g.
joint copyright ownership in mutually developed
software.287 In h 't t' h f th d tsuc a S1 ua 10n owners ip 0 e pro uc
by one party with a limited or unlimited license agreement
to the partner, perhaps also cross-license agreements, might
provide a better balance.288
283'd at 435-443.~ .,
284'd at 453.~ .,
285'd at 452.~ .,
286'd at 452.~ .,
287Joseph T. Adams, Corporate Partnering for Software
Development and Marketing, in 14TH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE,
at 553, 561 (PLI Patents, copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 344, 1992).
288id., at 561; Gordon, supra note 264, at 447-451.
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Virtual Enterprises are often developed among parties
that are or may be future competitors, making joint
ownership of intellectual property a major organizational
issue. If technically possible, they should therefore agree
to retain ownership of their contributions or, if this is
necessary, try to assign ownership to one partner or divide
ownership up and license/crosslicense the owned proprietary
knowledge to the other partner. Whatever general approach
the parties choose, they should remind themselves that in
the volatile and unpredictable high-technology setting where
Virtual enterprises will operate, very specific planning for
future developed proprietary knowledge will nearly be
, 'bl 289 Th t' t th 1lmpossl e. e par les mus us re y upon a
different than the traditional transactional approach,290
preferably a relational approach, relying upon trust in the
relationship and upon procedural planning that allows the
solution of problems as they appear throughout the
relationship rather than relying upon "substantial" planning
h ' 11 t 'd 291t at flxes a erms ln a vance.
This wisdom of a relationship approach may be most
compelling if the parties intend to create a new standard
and the focus of their enterprise is on research and
development. Here division of jointly developed proprietary
289BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 99.
290id., at 100.
291 Salbu, supra note 22, at 419-420.
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knowledge needs to be completely thought out. If they intend
only to further develop their already existing knowledge and
thereby create a new product, the problems are not as great,
but should nevertheless be addressed. The partners could
retain their ownership in the proprietary knowledge. As far
as they can anticipate that contributions to the new, joint
product can be separated, they should also own this part of
the new product. For the parts that can not be divided -
perhaps for the whole new product- they should assign the
ownership to the party that will predictably have the most
interest in owning that part, combined with a license to the
other partner. This could also result in division of
ownership among the partners and a complementary cross-
licensing agreement. Disputes could be made subject to
"relationship upholding" alternative dispute resolution
. 292mechanlsms.
6. Employees
As mentioned above, part of the resource commitment will
be the assignment of people by the partners to the Virtual
Enterprise. People belong to the "core competencies of
companies.293 Managing and developing these "human
resources" is at least as important for a strategic alliance
292see infra notes 380-390 and accompanying text.
293LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 149.
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f ' '1 294 d' t ' '1 thas 1nanC1a resources an 1 1S crUC1a for e
partners to assign the relevant people that will make the
295virtual Enterprise work.
since Virtual Enterprises are normally short-lived when
compared to "full blown" joint ventures, the partners
usually assign to the virtual Enterprise already employed
1 ' t d f h' , 1296 Wh 1peop e 1ns ea 0 1r1ng new personne en peop e
remain linked to their company, they will be loyal to their
company throughout a stable relationship while identifying
themselves with the current project.297 The return of the
employees to their old company will allow the company to
invest in its employees in order to create a well educated
t t 't t' 298work force tha represen s 1 score compe enC1es.
If no separate entity is created, the employees will stay
and work generally in their company, although they will be
assigned to the project or sometimes be "loaned" to the
299partner. If a new entity is created, this entity might
either hire the assigned people as its own employees or
, 1 l' t t 300 h'obta1n them through an emp oyee eas1ng con rac. T 1S
294 note 128, at 150.LORANGE & Roes, supra
295 supra note 12, at 141-BADARACCO,
296 & Roes, note 128, at 153.LORANGE supra
297
& DOVE, note 13, at 16.1 NAGEL supra
298id., at 10; LORANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 164.
299LoRANGE & Roes, supra note 128, at 153/154.
300Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.05 [4] [a].
66
assignment to a new entity or a project creates for the
employees certain problems whose seriousness is related to
the duration of the assignment and "deepness" of removal
301from the normal position on the employer company.
Employees may develop certain skills which may not have
an alternative application back in the old company after
termination of the virtual Enterprise.302 But for the
virtual Enterprise to be successful, its supporting
303personnel must be enthusiastic about the arrangement.
To minimize their worry about dismissal and insure they do
not end up with a competitor, the partners should carefully
plan how to "retrieve" these people after completing their
Virtual Enterprise duties.304 The partners could for
example give their employees a "right of return,,305 or
. I' f . 1 306 h' hprovlde career p annlng or thelr emp oyees w lC
301LORANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 151-164.
306LORANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 162.
305Harold L. Schneider, Commercial Joint Ventures-
Structural and Contractual Considerations, in COMMERCIAL JOINT
VENTURES ALl-ABA VIDEO LAw REVIEW (Q 176) 1, 1 (1989).
at 154, 160.302'd~ .,
303 .. 1 f C t'Thomas F. Vllleneuve & Danle M. Kau mann, rea ~ng
Successful Technology-Based Corporate Partnering Agreements,
COMPUTER LAw., Sept. 1992, at 10, 14; VILLENEUVE et al., supra
note 9, at 1-18.
304LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 154-155.
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demonstrate how their engagement in the Virtual Enterprise
307will be rewarding in both the short and long term.
A related problem is the fear of loss of benefits. If
employees are assigned completely to a new entity, this
entity would then have to provide payroll services, health
plans and pension plan benefits.308 This could have an
adversarial effect on their already existing and acquired
1 ,309 hemp oyee beneflts. It would t ere fore be preferable -
as far as possible- that the employees remain on their old
310employer's payroll or at least retain benefits in
their old employer's programs while being temporarily
assigned to the new entity.311 In essence the employees
should be completely protected against loosing any benefits
b 't f 't 1 t ' 312ecause of an asslgnmen or the Vlr ua En erprlse.
Another problem can arise when one or more of the
partners has contractual arrangements with unionized
employees. Job classifications and exact work rules can make
313the employee inflexible and non adaptive for change.
307 'II & K f t 303 t 14 VVl eneuve au mann, supra no e , a ; ILLENEUVE
et al., supra note 9, at 1-19.
308Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.05 [4] [a].
309schneider, supra note 305, at 1.
310Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.05 [4] [a].
311HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 351.
312LoRANGE & Roos, supra note 128, at 161.
313BADARACCO, supra note 12, at 57-58.
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This "organizational rigidity" of the labor unions hampers
the flexible adaptability needed in today's volatile
markets.314 Thus, the companies should try to establish a
mutually dependent relationship with their unions.315 Job
descriptions have to become intentionally vague and unions
and employers should develop a cO-destiny
relationship.316 If a recaltricant union blocks this
development the only remaining chance for the company might
be to try to de-certify the union.317 In sum, before
forming a Virtual Enterprise, the partners have to make sure
that their union relationships and contracts will not hamper
the flexibility and adaptability to work effectively within
the virtual Enterprise. Toward this end, the partners could
insert a provision into the contract that addresses these
problems and undertakes to resolve them individually so as
to comply with the virtual Enterprise agreement among the
partners.318 For example, they could outline in their
contract which key personnel will contribute to the virtual
Enterprise and who will be sent to the other's facilities.
The parties would then provide that this personnel will
remain on the payroll of each partner -including all
314DAVIDOW & MALONE, supra note 6, at 209.
315'd at 187.~ .,
316'd at 214.~ .,
317'd at 263.~ .,
318Adams, supra note 287, at 585.
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benefits- and shall return after termination to the original
employer. They could also obligate each other to make sure
that their employees are contractually available to complete
the necessary work within the virtual Enterprise.
7. Definition and Handling of Output
Partners in cooperative agreements that are competitors
generally have an incentive to cheat on the other partner to
319gain a competitive advantage. In corporate alliances,
partners therefore often want to make sure that the other
partner puts adequate efforts into technology development
and marketing.320 Partners will often want to design the
obligations as specific as possible, considering every
t' 321con lngency.
As far as possible, partners should define the
deliverables and set up quality and acceptance
criteria.322 They should set up "timetables" or "horizon
323points" to review performance progress. In
anticipation that a partner may default on his obligations,
319OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS242-243 (1975).
320HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 374.
321HARRIGAN, MANAGING, supra note 23, at 178.
322Adams, supra note 287, at 570; Moore, supra note 247,
at 188.
323SHERMAN, supra note 84, at 210; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,
supra note 98, at 364.
70
the partners should provide for remedies,324 e.g. giving
the other partner the right to take over the whole
enterprise, withdraw from it or terminate the
325agreement . Unfortunately, Virtual Enterprise
arrangements, as described, often are not able to be very
specific. Without precise performance standards, they have
to use a relational contracting approach which uses general
performance standard terms and requires different
performance control mechanisms than a discrete transactional
contract.326 Thus, setting goals rather than defining
specific performance works better under uncertain
circumstances.327 Setting these goals and making them an
active and driving force in the alliance is best done by
openly stating the expectations of the partners as well as
refining and specifying these so that the partners can live
th' d' t' 328 h t' h ldup to em ln a non- lsrup lve way. T e par les s ou
therefore in this situation obligate each other to use their
324 SHERMAN, supra note 94, at 210.
325schneider, supra note 305, at 7; Ingrao, supra note
90, at 417.
326charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1092-1093 (1981).
327LYNCH, supra note 2, at 132.
328id., at 107/108.
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"best efforts" to reach the intended
cooperate under a "general fiduciary
329goals and to
d t "330u y.
To reduce the remaining conflicts of interest between the
partners, they should then set up monitoring and "bonding"
mechanisms.331 Monitoring on one hand is done through
direct supervision of performance, e.g. auditing and
determination of compliance with certain performance
332standards. But specifically in technological alliances
it is difficult to assess if the technological performance
of a partner meets the requirements.333 The partners will
be satisfied and the alliance successful when they work
together in an effective trust relationship and both have an
't t' th f th II' 334 h t'ln eres ln e success 0 e a lance. T e par les
329Goetz & Scott, supra note 326, at 1117.
structured performance standards such as reciprocal
penalties, reciprocal rewards or bundling commitments.336
should thus have mutual ongoing incentives to work fairly
335together and achieve compliance with the open
at 1126.
at 1130.
at 1130.
331'd~ .,
330'd~ .,
332'd~ .,
333HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 34l.
334id., at 341, 369.
335VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-19.
336Salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 296-298.
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Penalties are reciprocal when they are exacted as one
partner fails to fulfil a certain obligation; the partner
t ' h d 337 t' 't I t'ge s punls e. Bu ln a Vlr ua Corpora lon exact
obligations are hard to define; it is therefore hard to
describe events that are supposed to be violations and that
trigger penalties. Nevertheless, penalty clauses can be
valuable as symbolic signs of commitment and of the "moral"
bl' t' f th t' 338olga lons 0 e par lese
In reciprocal awards, the parties define certain acts,
e.g. accomplishment of a certain goal or technical
development, that will lead to a transfer of a benefit to
the other partner and therefore will be rewarded.339
Rewards may include the extended transfer or licensing of
intellectual property rights through the partner, special
access to outputs from the enterprise, reimbursement of
costs or an enlarged share in profits from the
t ' 340en erprlse.
Commitment bundling links together the obligations of the
parties - the duty of one partner needs only to be fulfilled
if the other partner has already fulfilled his
obligation.341 This allows the partners a flexible
337'd at 299.~ .,
338'd at 299-300.~ .,
339'd at 300.~ .,
340'd at 30l.~ .,
341'd at 30l.~ .,
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response depending on the circumstances without resort to
1 1 h' 342ega mec anlsms.
similar to these bundling commitments would be situations
in which the parties are interdependent apart from the
II' 343 h th d d' Id' ha lance. T ese 0 er epen enCles wou glve t e
partners incentives to fulfill their obligations with best
efforts not to endanger the whole relationship.344 In
that case, using a "mutual hostage" situation, the partners
would need less performance monitoring for the single
II' 345a lance.
8. Benefit Allocation
In a joint venture the partners will define in advance
exactly how to spread risk and rewards.346 This will be
part of the exact distribution of responsibilities, risks
347and rewards. The reward system is based upon detailed
342 id. at 301-302. An example here is the alliance
between Motorola and Toshiba in which Motorola promises to
release microprocessor technology incrementally as Toshiba
fulfills its promise to enhance Motorola's market share in the
Japanese semiconductor market; see Gary Hamel et al.,
Collaborate with Your Competitors- and Win, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-
Feb. 1989, at 133, 139.
343salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 302.
344'd~ .,
345'd~ .,
at 303.
at 303.
346LYNCH, supra note 2, at 132.
347id., at 135-136.
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, d It' 348 f .promlses an regu a lons. Un ortunately, ln the
virtual Enterprise the exact responsibilities and
contributions of the parties are not completely defined, but
left to the evolving relationship, relying heavily on the
defined goals. The parties cannot set up exactly which
efforts are needed to reach these goals, instead they depend
heavily on incentive schemes. Under circumstances where it
is impossible to predict exactly the contribution each party
has to give to finish the work, fixed reward terms would
ft d· ., t' 349 d'o en en up ln gross lnequl les. A Justment
mechanisms have therefore to be set up to accommodate these
changing circumstances350 such as establishing tentative
reward shares subject to arbitral adjustments.351
The parties can also agree to reimburse the partners for
their expenses and that they share in the profits depending
on their "agreed upon value-added contributions."352 For
example, they could agree to use incoming revenue first to
reimburse the partners for their costs and divide the
remaining profits depending on the value each of them
contributed to the end-result. Cost reimbursement might
already have been implemented as a performance incentive
348 2 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 8, at 84.
349 Aksen, supra note 153, at 599.
350'd~ .
351'd~ .
3521 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 16-17.
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scheme which is a typical neoclassical flexibility
. t t 353 . 11 d .. b .lns rumen. Flna y, eC1Slons a out relmbursement
could be made subject to a dispute resolution
h . 354mec anlsm.
9. Antitrust Considerations
Virtual Enterprise partners are often already actual
competitors or/and will be competitors in the future. Under
the antitrust conspiracy doctrine, any collaboration between
competing companies concerning their competitive efforts
within mutual or potentially mutual markets, can be a
conspiracy in restraint of trade.355 If the alliance is
incorporated, it can be scrutinized under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and would be illegal if it would substantially
lessen competition. If it was not incorporated it could
still be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act if it
was a conspiracy in restraint of trade.356
This scrutinization of cooperative mechanisms has been
challenged as outdated due to reliance on late 19th century
353See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text.
354See infra notes 380-390 and accompanying text.
355Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Law and Innovation
Cooperation, 4(3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES97 (1990), reprinted in
COLLABORATIONAMONG COMPETITORS911, 916 (Eleanor M. Fox & Thomas
T. Halverson eds., 1991).
356 . t 1 .Harry M. Reasoner & Ann Lents, U.S. Ant~trus Ana ys~s
of Joint Ventures, in COMMERCIALJOINT VENTURES ALl-ABA VIDEO LAW
REVIEW (Q 176) 85, 87 (1989).
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and early 20th century concepts of competition.357 It is
argued that global competition requires cooperation among
domestic companies now inhibited by earlier interpretations
of the antitrust laws,358 and thus changes are
359, 360needed; far reach1ng proposals have been made.
In contrast, others have noted that rigorous domestic
t't" t' 1 fIb 1 t't' 361compe 1 10n 1S essen 1a or g 0 a compe 1 1veness
and that current antitrust law interpretation and
enforcement allows enough innovative collaborations if
f 'I' t d 'th' h d 362aC1 1ta e W1 m1nor c anges an reforms.
within the context of this disagreement about reform, the
parties to a contract need to determine possible antitrust
implications that could void their agreements before closing
the contract.363 From this perspective the standards for
11 b t' t b' 364co a ora 1ve agreemen s are am 19UOUS.
357 1 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 41.
358id.; Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, 4(3) J. Econ.
Perspectives 75 (1990), reprinted in COLLABORATION AMONG
COMPETITORS887,887 (Eleanor M. Fox & Thomas T. Halverson eds.,
1991) .
3591 NAGEL & DOVE, supra note 13, at 41.
360Jorde & Teece, supra note 358, 903 et seq.
361MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVEADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 117-
122, esp. 122 (1990).
362Brodley, supra note 355, at 911.
363 bk' t tDo 1n & Bur, supra no e
STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 37.
364Jordon & Teece, supra note 358, at 899.
209, at 1-7; HARRIGAN,
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Because these agreements are generally aimed to advance
innovation and create efficiencies, generally a rule of
, I' d 365, , , .reason 1S app 1e. Ant1compet1t1ve effects are we1ghed
against efficiencies and other business justifications in
order to determine if the intended efficiencies will lead to
competitively overly restrictive results.366 If parties
in a vertical relationship rely upon resale price
, t th' Id b 'd '11 1 367ma1n enance, 1S wou e V1ewe as per se 1 ega,
but non-price vertical restrictions that are part of a
cooperative agreement and aimed towards efficiencies are
usually okay under the rule of reason, following the
Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 12.4
(, d J ) 368 d t .. t' t't'1ssue an. 23, 1985. In e erm1n1ng an 1compe 1 1ve
effects in horizontal settings, first the relevant
geographic and product markets are determined.369 Next it
is determined whether the agreement reduces existing or
potential competition between the partners in the market
that the enterprise will serve. 370 For the potential
competition analysis in the new market, a parallel to a
365id.; Reasoner & Lents, supra note 356, at 85-86.
366Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of
Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913 (1986).
367Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 83, at 523 et seq.
368VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 3-45.
369Reasoner & Lents, supra note 356, at 86, 88-89.
370pitofsky, supra note 366, at 896 et seq.
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merger between the partners is made using the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines and the HHI index.371 If a
merger would be allowed, a collaborative agreement will be
allowed; if a merger would not be allowed, anticompetitive
ff t d 372 h' t f k te ec s are presume. Ac levemen 0 mar e power or
373monopoly would weigh heavily against the agreement.
Weighing against possible existing competitive restraints
are assessments of resulting competitive efficiencies
through the integration of efforts between the partners and
of whether the intended product would have otherwise been
developed by any of the parties at all.374 Of course,
these redeeming aspects are tempered by assessments of
whether such efficiencies and other pro-competitive effects
ld h b h' d b 1 t ' t' 375cou ave een ac leve y esser res rlC lng means.
As a practical matter collaborative agreements between
smaller firms used to gain efficiencies and to create
innovations, are not challenged by the antitrust enforcement
agencies.376 Alliances in the high-technology area by
371Reasoner & Lents, supra note 356, at 86, 92.
372id. at 86
373VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 3-46.
374pitofsky, supra note 366, at 904 et seq.; VILLENEUVE et
al., supra note 9, at 3-46.
375VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 3-46, Pitofsky,
supra note 366, at 911.
376Brodley, supra note 355, at 917; LYNCH, supra note 2,
at 114.
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even large companies are not challenged either.377
Contractual agreements also attract less antitrust attention
378than cases in which a new entity is created.
Furthermore, parties using relational contracting with less
precise provisions, encounter less antitrust risk because
the contract 1) specifies goals and objectives rather than
concrete actions that could be attacked, 2) is flexible and
allows the partners to change the agreement if markets and
antitrust considerations change and 3) generally allows
. t . t' 379eaSler ermlna lon.
From a practical standpoint, virtual Enterprises are
created by companies to create innovations and products in
high technology markets where they would alone not be able
to compete. Often the market share will be too low to imply
anticompetitive effects. Therefore, if the parties create
reasonable provisions and do not set up overrestrictive or
unrelated collateral agreements that restrict their
competition beyond what is necessary to achieve the intended
goals, virtual Enterprises should not meet Antitrust
problems.
377John Markoff, Microsoft and 2 Cable Giants Close to an
Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at Section 1, p.1.
378 LYNCH, supra note 2, at 114.
379salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 285-287.
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10. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
virtual Enterprises are formed to reach strategic goals
and to make the competitive advantages of both sides work
together. However, the interests of partners in the virtual
Enterprise are rarely identical and thus disputes are likely
to arise.380 The classical contract approach relies on
litigation with the goal to decide and to end the
d' t 381 hI' I '1SpU e. T e neoc aSS1ca approach 1S not as
adversarial, but does use arbitration to end a dispute, with
resulting costs and a mechanism that are somewhat similar to
l't' t' 3821 19a lon.
Unfortunately successful continuation of a relationship
after the use of these adversarial procedures may be
endangered;383 in effect sacrificed for the sake of
dispute solution.384 As stressed throughout this paper,
the success of the virtual Enterprise will very much depend
on a trustful, ongoing relationship. Too many details have
to be left open in the contract to achieve speed and
flexibility of the enterprise. The parties therefore need
380HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 373.
381, t tMacne11 1978, supra no e 138, a 891.
382id.; VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-20.
383 '1 t 38 t 891Macne1 1978, supra no e 1 , a .
384Salbu, supra note 22, at 407.
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to create an effective dispute resolution mechanism that
will not destroy the relationship.385
Non-adversarial mechanisms such as negotiation and
mediation are thus preferable for the Virtual
Enterprise.386 Understanding the "give and take needed in
business", the parties should be able to settle any
d' t· 387 f 1 ' . t t d dl klSpU es. In success u ]Oln ven ures, ea oc is
somehow always avoided by managers through
t' t' 388 t ff t' 1 t' , ,nego la lone Mos e ec lve are esca a lng provlslons
that will bring disputes first to lower levels, e.g. members
of the partner's executive boards and only after failure
here to a higher level, e.g. the presidents of the
parents.389 This avoids making issues to "points of
principle" at an early stage that finally will separate the
390partners.
11. Termination
Since the Virtual Enterprise is designed to achieve
specific goals which may be accomplished quickly or become
385Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-10.
386salbu, supra note 22, at 407.
387WILLIAMSON 1975, supra note 319, at 107.
388HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.
389scrivner, supra note 30, at 31; Ingrao, supra note 90,
at 418.
390scrivner, supra note 30, at 31.
82
irrelevant to the partners' business strategies, appropriate
provisions need to be made for its termination391 and
consequential distribution of rights and assets.392
Specific events that normally trigger termination include
expiration of the defined term of the alliance, mutual
consent of the parties, material breach of the contract
through one partner, occurrence of certain events (like
fulfillment of purpose, major change in anticipated
competitive circumstances etc), bankruptcy of a partner and
1 t' th h 'th t t t ' t 393e ec lon roug el er par ner 0 ermlna e.
Since virtual Enterprise partners frequently are unable
to predict how the alliance will fare, setting of arbitrary
394terms is seldom prudent. The other termination
criteria lie on a continuum including mutual consent of the
parties, certain events and convenience of a single party.
Reliance on specifically described termination events much
like reliance upon a specific date is normally undesirable
because of uncertainty about the business significance of
395future events. Conversely if managers of an alliance
can successfully deal with upcoming problems unencumbered by
391 th ' , 't t d t't'Ka rln R. Harrlgan, Jo~n Ven ures an Compe ~ ~ve
strategy, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 141, at 145 (1988).
392Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-11.
393 h 'd t tSc nel er, supra no e 305, a 10.
394LYNCH, supra note 2, at 155-156; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES,
supra note 98, at 367.
395HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.
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artificial deadlines, they may find it best to terminate
finally upon mutual consent once the intended purpose of the
alliance is achieved.396 It might be argued that
termination due to breach of contract or the occurrence of a
specific event creates high exit barriers that would
motivate continuation of the relationship, but prolonging
the life of an ailing alliance is best viewed as a classical
, h ,,397 d' h h 't 1punls ment provlslon. Depen lng on ow t e Vlr ua
Enterprise partners perceive the need of flexibility, they
should therefore lower exit barriers, perhaps even
incorporating a convenience termination clause for enhancing
flexibility. Termination at the convenience of one partner
might be problematic and dangerous for the remaining
partner,398 but might have to be necessarily available
for the partners operating under highly uncertain
, t 399Clrcums ances.
In the latter case, the protection of the partner comes
through careful planning of rights and assets division and
, d k 400 't'perhaps compensatlon for complete wor. Termlna lon
consequences should be laid down for each kind of
396'd~ .
397salbu & Brahm, supra note 201, at 292.
398Adams, supra note 287, at 582.
399HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 324.
400Adams, supra note 287, at 582.
84
termination event to fit the specific circumstances.401
The division of intellectual property rights should follow
402the above outlined rules, confidential material should
be returned and confidentiality continued for the
403future. If a new entity with its own assets is
founded, the partners need to provide either for the
division of assets or liabilities or for a buyout at a
certain price by one of the partners.404 In case
liquidation is intended, the parties should agree upon a
405liquidation procedure. A possible division system
would be the "Russian roulette system" which does not have
fixed buyout or evaluation terms because after termination
one partner will divide the "pie" up and the other will
choose between the pieces.406 If no new entity was
founded, division of assets or liabilities of the "child" is
not needed, but the partners might consider providing for
compensation if one of them incurred special expenses or
liabilities during the alliance.407
401VILLENEUVE et al., supra note 9, at 1-20.
402 . tSee supra notes 245-292 and accompanYlng tex .
403Dobkin & Burt, supra note 209, at 1-28 n.28.
404LYNCH, supra note 2, at 156; HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra
note 98, at 365-366.
405Glover & Wallace, supra note 94, § 7.15 [2];
Schneider, supra note 305, at 11.
406HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 367.
407 Ingrao, supra note, at 417-418.
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The future of the employees working for the alliance upon
termination has already been discussed; they should
generally remain with or return to their original
408employer. How the parties should deal with
intellectual property has also been discussed
, 1 409 , '1 1 'h tprevlous y. Slml ar y, lf t e par ners foresee other
problems arising from the enterprise's activities, they
410should also try to provide appropriate clauses.
In the view of the many details that need to be left open
in virtual Enterprise contracting, including such important
issues like the obligations of the partners and the exact
division of benefits, partners in a virtual Enterprise must
provide in a similar way for termination uncertainties. They
need to outline some crucial provisions and then make the
termination issues dependent on the situation as evolved
throughout the relationship; expectations of the parties as
expressed in the contract and as evolved should prevail over
specified provisions laid down under highly uncertain
circumstances. Negotiation and dispute resolution should
also be applied to the termination mechanisms and
consequences of the virtual Enterprise.
408see supra notes 293-318 and accompanying text.
STRATEGIES, supra note 98, at 366.
409
S ee supra
410HARRIGAN,
notes 245-292 and accompanying text.
IV. Conclusion
Contemporary competitive strategies, especially in high
technology areas, frequently dictate that companies
concentrate on their core competencies and team up with
partners for the supply of complementary resources and
knowledge, thereby creating virtual Enterprises. To support
the development, maintenance and termination of such
enterprises, lawyers must supply unconventional, flexible
legal services. The volatile competitive environment in
which virtual Enterprises function requires especially a
more flexible, relational approach to contracting that
supports relationships and helps the business partners to
achieve their strategic goals. Contracts still need to be
formulated in some detail to support the enterprise and
protect the partners, but many important questions need to
remain open if the partners want to remain flexible and want
to promptly form and dissolve the enterprise. The solution
of these questions must be sought throughout relationship's
life; procedural provisions are therefore at least as
important as substantive provisions. This contractual
approach might be unfamiliar for lawyers, but will be needed
to maintain the competitiveness of legal services and
businesses today and in the future.
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